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We analyze the following questions associated with outsourcing and profit sharing under 
imperfect labour markets. How does strategic outsourcing influence wage formation, profit 
sharing and employee effort when firms commit to optimal profit sharing before wage 
formation or decide for profit sharing after wage formation? What is the relationship between 
outsourcing, profit sharing, and equilibrium unemployment when profit sharing is also a part 
of a compensation scheme in all industries? We find that if firms will decide on profit sharing 
before the wage formation, higher outsourcing decreases wage whereas profit sharing has 
an ambiguous effect. Under flexible profit sharing wage is smaller than in the case of 
committed profit sharing. For equilibrium unemployment, we find that if there is also profit 
sharing in other industries, the effects of outsourcing and profit sharing on the unemployment 
rate is ambiguous both in the committed and flexible case. 
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1.       Introduction
High wage differences across countries constitute an important explanation for the
currently significant business practice of international outsourcing. For example, 1.10
€ per hour in China is very low in comparison with 27 € per hour e.g. in Denmark,
Germany or Norway. These wage differentials could lead to outsourcing (see e.g.
Sinn (2007) for details, and also Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West
dichotomy of outsourcing). Glass and Saggi (2001) have studied the causes of
outsourcing and its effects and they found that higher international outsourcing lowers
the relative wage of domestic workers, while it increases the profits and thereby
creates greater incentives for innovation.
It is known that higher wages affect workers’ productivity which is influenced
by their effort. Of course, according empirical evidence another way to stimulate the
effort is profit sharing. Profit sharing is an empirically important phenomenon in
many OECD countries. Pendleton et al. (2001) have presented detailed data on profit
sharing schemes in 14 EU-countries. For example, among all western EU-countries in
1999/2000 a double-digit percentage of the workplaces use profit sharing in Austria,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom. The lowest incidences are found in Denmark, Italy, and Greece. For further
evidence regarding the incidence of profit sharing, we refer to the DICE data base,
collected by CESifo, http://www.CESifo.de,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  C o n y o n  a n d  F r e e m a n
(2001).
In terms of profit sharing Koskela and Stenbacka (2004a) have offered a
framework to analyze employment, effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face
stochastic revenue shocks. Moreover, they have investigated the interaction between
labour and credit market imperfections in the presence of profit sharing (see Koskela
and Stenbacka (2004b). In these papers they have analyzed committed profit sharing
which is decided before wage negotiation. Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) have also
studied the differences between committed profit sharing and flexible profit sharing,
which is decided after wage formation. They have shown that the optimal profit share
under commitment is higher than under flexibility because through a profit share
commitment the firms can induce wage moderation. In these papers they have also
studied the relationship between profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment.3
As profit sharing is now commonly incorporated in the compensation
schemes, and international outsourcing has recently increased among western EU-
countries and in the United States, then it is important to study their relationship and
implications for workers’ effort, wage formation and unemployment when profit
sharing is also a part of a compensation scheme in all other industries. This is the
topic, which is our focus in this paper. We assume that firms commit to outsourcing
before profit sharing, wage negotiation, labour demand and effort determination.
Moreover, and importantly, we also analyze the implications of two alternative time
sequences in terms of profit sharing decision: (i) firms might commit to profit sharing
before base wage negotiation or (ii) firms deciding about profit sharing only after
knowing the result of base wage negotiation.
In our framework we analyze the following questions associated with
outsourcing and profit sharing under imperfect labour markets: How does strategic
outsourcing influence wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort, when firms
commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or deciding about profit
sharing after wage formation. We also analyze the relationship between outsourcing,
profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment under the assumption that profit share is
part of the compensation scheme in all industries. Finally, we briefly look at the long-
run perspective for the optimal production mode in terms of strategic outsourcing.
First, we show that in the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticity of labour
demand depends positively both on the amount of outsourcing and on the base wage,
but negatively on the size of profit sharing. As a result we also show that in the case
of committed profit sharing strategic outsourcing has a negative effect on wage
formation. This lies in conformity with empirics and results from our assumption of
perfect substitutability between outsourcing and effective domestic labour. Under
flexible profit sharing the wage is smaller than in the case of committed profit
sharing. We also find that the profit share under commitment in the presence of
outsourcing is larger (smaller) than that associated with flexibility if the base wage
depends negatively (positively) on profit sharing.
If profit sharing is a part of outside option in other industries outsourcing,
profit sharing will have ambiguous effects on equilibrium unemployment. Also in the
absence of outsourcing, profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium4
unemployment. In terms of optimal long-run strategic outsourcing wage moderation
will have the positive indirect marginal profit in the presence of committed profit
sharing due to wage moderation, but in the presence of flexible profit sharing this
effect is a priori ambiguous.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents the basic structure of theoretical
framework and two different time sequences in terms of profit sharing decision in the
presence of outsourcing activity. The determination of labour demand by firms and
effort by workers are presented in section 3. Section 4 investigates the wage
formation by monopoly labour union in the presence of strategic outsourcing and
committed profit sharing, and section 5 studies the wage formation by monopoly
labour union with strategic outsourcing and flexible profit sharing. Section 6 explores
the implications of strategic outsourcing and different time decisions of profit sharing
on equilibrium unemployment. Section 7 studies briefly the optimal long-run
outsourcing given the wage formation, the profit sharing, the labour demand, and the
employee effort. Finally, we present conclusions in section 8.
2. Basic Framework
We consider a representative firm and assume that output depends not only on the
units of domestic labour but also on the effort supplied by workers, i.e. the workers’
productivity. This lies in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis
1. Also
production combines international outsourcing which is substitute for domestic
effective labour. We analyze two alternative timing decisions made by the firm, the
labour union and the worker.
The timing structure (I) captures the idea that the representative firm commits
both to outsourcing and profit sharing in anticipation of wage determination. After
wage formation, the representative firm determines employment and the
representative worker decides on effort provision. The partly alternative timing
structure (II) will change the timing of determination of profit sharing and wage
1 For a survey and several important seminal articles, see e.g. the book edited by Akerlof and Yellen
(1986).5
determination by keeping other timing aspects similar as in (I). In this case the
representative firm is flexible in the decision of profit sharing by deciding it after
wage formation. We summarize these alternative timing decisions in Figure 1.
2
Figure 1: Alternative time sequences of decisions in terms of employment, effort,
wage formation, profit sharing and outsourcing
(I)   Strategic outsourcing and committed profit sharing:
   Stage 1               Stage 2                 Stage 3             Stage 4
   outsourcing       profit                    wage                 labour demand L and
M                     sharing W              formation w     effort determination e
(II)  Strategic outsourcing and flexible profit sharing:
    Stage    1         Stage 2                  Stage 3             Stage 4
   outsourcing      wage                     profit               labour demand L and
M                    formation w         sharing W         effort determination e
This timing structure seems plausible when the implementation of a production mode
with outsourcing requires irreversible investments concerning the establishment of a
network of foreign suppliers. Of course, the relative timing of wage formation in the
presence of outsourcing might be different in certain circumstances. Such a reversed
timing structure would be relevant if the firms flexibly adjusted their production
mode, and decided whether to initiate foreign outsourcing once the domestic wage is
determined.
3
In the following sections we turn to an analysis of these two alternative
decisions taking place at the different stages of the interaction between the
2 Whether profit sharing is committed or flexible in terms of base wage formation is an important new
topic for empirical research.
3 Skaksen (2004) has analyzed this case using a Cobb-Douglas production function also in the case of
homogenous domestic labour, but both in the absence of effort determination of workers and profit
sharing of firms. Also Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple two-stage game between a
monopoly  union and a firm by  assuming that the unio n sets wages before the firm decides on the
degree of outsourcing and the level of production. They also abstract from effort determination of
workers and profit sharing of firms. They argue that under flexible outsourcing the costs of outsourcing
has an ambiguous effect on the wage set by the union.6
representative firm, the monopoly labour union and the representative worker by
using the backward induction and solving the game in reverse order.
3. Labour Demand and Employee Effort
Here we characterize the optimal labour demand by the representative firm and the
effort by the representative worker in stage 4 by taking profit sharing W , wage
formation w, and outsourcing M  as given. The technology is assumed to satisfy the
following revenue function
4









  M eL M L e R                                        (1)
where L is unit of labour, e describes the effort determination, M  indicates the
amount of outsourcing, and 1 ! G .
5 We assume that outsourcing and effective labour
are perfect substitutes. The representative firm makes irreversible investment   M c
with the properties that     . 0 ' ' , ' ! M c M c  This captures the idea according to which
the marginal cost advantages also requires irreversible investment into the
establishment of networks of suppliers in low-wage countries.
The disutility of effort is assumed to satisfy the following convex function
 
J J
/ 1 e e g    with 1 0  J , i.e.     0 ' ' , ' ! e g e g . The individual utility function for
the employed worker is (2a) and for the unemployed worker (2b)
 e g
L
w u     S
W
                                                    (2a)
4 Specifying the inverse product demand function according to a monopolistic product market








  D p , 1 ! G , gives the following inverse elasticity of demand
G
1
/    p D pD  so
that 1 / !    G D p Dp . By assuming   M eL M L e F    , ,  and D F    gives another suggestion for (1).
In what follows we do not elaborate the potential role of product market competition for our issues.
5 We assume by following Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) that effort is observable and verifiable. If
effort is partly unobservable, this implies that firms are interesting to monitor workers. This is of course
an important new research topic.7
b u                                                                             (2b)
where S  captures the firm’s profit and b stands for the unemployed worker’s
exogenous outside option.
The profit function can now be expressed as











.                           (3)
Given , M w, and e the first-order condition for the firm’s optimal labour demand
can be expressed as
  0
1
     
 w e M eL L G S ,                                          (4)
and the second-order condition   . 0
1 2
1
    

 e M eL LL G
G
G
S  The first-order condition
can be re-expressed  as
e
M
e w L   
  1 G G                                                         (5)
where the direct wage elasticity of labour demand is 1 ! G . According to (5)
, , ,) , , (
  
  e M w L L , so that higher wage rate and higher outsourcing, which is substitute
for domestic labour, will decrease labour demand and higher employee’s effort will
increase labour demand. But labour demand (5) does not directly depend on profit
sharing, which lies in conformity with empirical evidence (see e.g. Wadwani and
Wall (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997)).
The first-order condition in terms of effort determination for equation (2a) is
 0 '      e g
L
u e e S
W
.                                                 (6)8
Using     1 / 1 '
  
J e e g  and   L M eL e G S
1
     equation (6) implies
 





W    is the elasticity of effort with respect to profit sharing (see about this,
Koskela and Stenbacka (2006)). Therefore the optimal effort by worker is a positive










e   , so
that profit sharing and base wage enhance productivity by increasing effort provision
and thereby affect labour demand indirectly.
6 But outsourcing will have no effect in
the case of perfect substitutability between outsourcing M and employee effort e.
4.     Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Strategic
Outsourcing and Committed Profit Sharing
Now we continue to analyze the timing structure (I), when the firm commits to the
profit share prior to the base wage formation and by taking outsourcing as given and
allowing for their effects on labour demand and effort determination.
4.1.     Wage Formation
By analyzing the base wage formation by monopoly labour union under strategic
outsourcing and committed profit sharing in stage 3, the objective function of
monopoly labour union is assumed to be
    bN L e g L b w V       S W                                (8)
6 This finding lies in conformity with empirics (see e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and Wilson
(1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), Kruse (1992), and Wadhwani and Wall (1990)). Of course, we
have to mention that these issues have not been studied to our knowledge empirically in the presence of
outsourcing.9
where b  captures the exogenous minimum income for all labour union members N .
Maximizing (8) in terms of base wage subject to labour demand (5), effort
determination (7) and given outsourcing and profit sharing gives the following first-
order condition
      0 '          w w w w w e e Lg L e g b w L L V S W ,               (9)
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w Lw 1 1                                     (11)
is the total wage elasticity of labour demand (see Appendix 1 for details). Therefore,
the total wage elasticity K  depends on the base wage rate, the amount of outsourcing
and the effort determination, but it is constant in the absence of outsourcing. It should
be emphasized that the wage determination (10) is expressed in the implicit (not
explicit) form, because the wage elasticity of labour demand associated with the











c A depends also on the base wage via labour demand
and effort determination according to (11).
7 By calculating  
  0 '
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(10).10
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J G K .               (12a)
This positive relationship results from the fact that higher outsourcing will increase
the ratio between outsourcing and effective labour, i.e. eL M / . Our finding lies in
conformity with empirics (see e.g. Hasan et al (2007), Slaughter (2001) and Senses
(2006)).
Next we characterize the relationship between the wage elasticity of labour
demand and the base wage rate, i.e. we have
    0 ) 1 ( 1
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K .    (12b)
Therefore, the wage elasticity depends positively on the base wage rate in the
presence of outsourcing. In the absence of outsourcing, this effect is, however, zero,
i.e. . 0
0  
  M w K
The relationship between the base wage elasticity and profit sharing can be
written as
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KW  The base wage elasticity depends negatively on
profit sharing, because higher profit sharing will decrease the ratio between11
outsourcing and effective labour, i.e. eL M / . It is important to emphasize that there
will be no effect in the absence of outsourcing, i.e. . 0
0  
  M W K
We can now summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 1: In the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticity of
labour demand depends positively on the amount of outsourcing and on
the base wage and negatively on the size of profit sharing.
In the absence of outsourcing the total wage elasticity is slightly different. In this case
the total wage elasticity is smaller, i.e.  J G G K 1
0    
  M  (see about this, Koskela
and Stenbacka (2006)). This implies the following explicit monopoly labour union’s
base wage formation
 
> @  
b w
M W JW J G G
J G G
    
 
 
  1 1 ) 1 (
1
0 .                               (13)
Next we characterize the comparative statics in a different way than in the explicit
formulations (see Appendix 2 for details). After characterizing the base wage
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  l a b o u r  d e m a n d  i n  t e r m s  o f  v a r i o u s  p a r a m e t e r s ,  w e  n o w  a n a l y z e  t h e
effects of these parameters on the wage formation by the monopoly labour union.
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to outsourcing gives
 



















































Therefore, higher outsourcing will decrease the base wage formation, because higher
outsourcing will increase wage elasticity of labour demand. This lies in conformity
with empirics under our assumption according to which there is substitutability
between outsourcing and domestic labour (see e.g. Munch and Skaksen (2005)).
The derivative of equation (10) with respect to profit sharing can express as12
    > @
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Therefore, under this framework with outsourcing the effect of committed profit
sharing on the base wage formation by monopoly labour union is a priori ambiguous,
because under outsourcing the profit sharing will have a negative effect to wage
formation via the mark-up, but also a positive effect due to a negative effect on wage
elasticity.
In the absence of outsourcing equation (15) can be re-expressed as follows
        > @
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    
  
  W JW J G G
J G G J J G G
W M d
dw
,                  (16)
so that profit sharing has an ambiguous effect on the mark-up of wage formation.
8
We can now summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 2: In the presence of outsourcing and committed profit
sharing a higher outsourcing will decrease the base wage, whereas
profit sharing has an ambiguous effect on the base wage. Also in the
absence of outsourcing, higher profit sharing will have a ambiguous
effect on the base wage, but a negative effect if     J G G J 1 1   ! .
8 We have   1 1 !   J G G , but the sign of     J G G J 1 1     is a priori ambiguous, so that




also ambiguous. Of course, profit sharing will have a wage moderation effect in the absence of
outsourcing under the assumption     J G G J 1 1   ! . Using a U.S. data Black and Lynch (2000) have
shown that the usage of profit sharing results in lower regular pay for workers, but in Wadhwani and
Wall (1990) and in Kraft and Ugarkovic (2005) it has been shown in empirics by using a UK data and a
German panel data that firms introducing profit sharing do not reduce base wages thus implying a
supplementary (not substitutable) character of profit sharing. This issue should be studied empirically
much more in the case of various countries.13
4.2.  Committed  Profit  Sharing
In the timing structure of decisions (I) in stage 2 the representative firm commits to
p r o f i t  s h a r i n g  s o  t h a t  p r o f i t  i s  m a x i m i z e d  s u b j e c t  t o  l a b o u r  d e m a n d  ( 5 ) ,  e f f o r t
determination (7) and wage formation by the monopoly labour union (10) and by
taking outsourcing as given,  i.e.
     » ¼
º
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The first-order condition is   0 1      W S W S , where the indirect profit can be
expressed as > @  M c
e
wM
e w  
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W ,                                                   (18)
because 0   W L  due to the envelope theorem ( 0   L S ).
9 Next, we have to solve the
optimal committed profit sharing by using equations (18) and the indirect profit in
  0 1      W S W S , so that for given outsourcing M , the optimal committed profit
sharing can be presented as (see Appendix 3)
9 The derivative     > @
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.               (19a)
This is an implicit form because concerning the RHS of (19a) employee effort, labour
demand and base wage formation depend on profit sharing.
In the absence of outsourcing the optimal committed profit sharing can be re-





































0                               (19b)
(see about this, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006)). We assume that in the case without
outsourcing 0 
w
wW W  holds. With that assumption a comparison between (19a) and
(19b) shows that in the presence of outsourcing the optimal committed profit share is
smaller than in the absence of outsourcing, i.e.
0   
M
c c W W  if 0 !
w
wW W  holds in the
presence of outsourcing. If 0 
w
wW W  under outsourcing, then the relation between
c W
and
0   M
c W  is a priori ambiguous. Moreover, in the denominator of (19a)
   





G G  and it is zero in (19b). In both cases (19a) and (19b), higher
wage elasticity with respect to profit sharing, w w / W W , will have a negative effect on
the optimal committed profit sharing.
10
We can now summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 3: In the presence of outsourcing the optimal committed
profit share is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing if in the
presence of outsourcing profit share elasticity of wage formation is
10 As we mentio ned in f oo tno te 8, the ef fect of prof it sharing o n b ase w age is am impo rtant  new
empirical research topic.15
positive, but if the elasticity is negative in the presence of outsourcing
then the relation is a priori ambiguous.
5.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Strategic
Outsourcing and Flexible Profit Sharing
We now use the timing structure (II) to analyze the wage formation before the flexible
profit sharing by the representative firm. After that and by taking outsourcing as given
and committed before wage and profit sharing determinations we allow for their
effects on labour demand and employee effort.
5.1.   Flexible Profit Sharing
First, we study the optimal profit sharing in stage 3 decided after outsourcing and
wage formation subject to labour demand and employee effort determinations. Now
the profit sharing is decided to maximize profit by taking both the base wage and the
outsourcing as given, i.e.
     » ¼
º
« ¬
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J W w e                                                                   (20c)
The first-order condition is similar as in the case of committed profit sharing in terms
of the first-order condition, i.e.   0 1      W S W S , where the indirect profit is
> @  M c
e
wM
e w  
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S . But as we will show, the optimal profit sharing is
slightly different in the case of flexible profit sharing decision.
To allow for the envelope theorem due to 0   L S , so that W L  is not taken into
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. This can be solved for
the optimal flexible profit sharing in the presence of outsourcing as
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W .                    (21a)
As in the case of committed optimal profit sharing (see equation (19a)), this is also an
implicit form, because both employee effort and labour demand also depend on profit
sharing (see equations (5) and (7)) concerning the RHS of (21a).











f .                                             (21b)
Comparison between (21a) and (21b) shows that in the presence of outsourcing the
optimal flexible profit share is smaller than in the  absence of outsourcing, i.e.
0   
M
f f W W  because    






Comparing the optimal profit share under commitment (equation (19a)) and under
flexibility (equation (21a)), it is easy to show that it depends on what is the
relationship between the wage rate and profit sharing. If the base wage depends
negatively (positively) on profit sharing, then optimal profit share under commitment
is larger (smaller) than that associated with flexibility,
f c W W ! (
f c W W  ). Of course, in
the absence of outsourcing we have higher optimal committed profit share than
optimal flexible profit share, i.e.




c W W   by comparing equations (19b) and
(21b), when 0 
w
wW W holds. But if not, then the opposite occurs.17
Now we analyze the effects of the parameters outsourcing and base wage on
flexible profit sharing under strategic outsourcing (see Appendix 4 for details). The
effect of M  can be obtained by differentiating (21a) to get
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Our assumptions are 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J
, and we also assume
that     0 1
2 !   W J G X eL , sound to be reasonable if optimal flexible profit sharing is
small enough, so that in this case optimal flexible profit sharing depends negatively
on outsourcing.
Differentiating (21a) with respect to base wage gives
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where        K G
W
J









Y . If optimal flexible profit
sharing is small enough, then under the assumption     0 1
2 !   W J G X eL , the base
wage rate will have the negative effect on flexible profit sharing, while it will have no









We can now summarize our findings as follows.18
Proposition 4: In the presence of outsourcing and flexible profit
sharing under reasonable assumptions higher base wage and higher
outsourcing will decrease profit sharing, but in the absence of
outsourcing the base wage will have no effect on flexible profit sharing.
5.2.   Wage Formation under Flexible Profit Sharing
We now analyze the base wage formation in stage 2 by monopoly labour union under
committed outsourcing and flexible profit sharing. The objective function can be
written as
    bN L e g L b w V       S W ,                            (24)
where b captures the exogenous minimum income for all labour union members.
Maximizing (24) in terms of the base wage subject to labour demand (5), effort
determination (7), and profit sharing determination (21a), gives
      0 '           w w w w w w e e Lg L e g b w L L V W S S W ,            (25)
where there is the new term w W S  compared with the case of committed profit sharing
formulation (9). Using equation (23) we can follow that 0  w W S . Therefore higher
wage rate will have negative effect on flexible profit sharing, so that the base wage by
monopoly labour union under committed outsourcing and flexible profit sharing is
smaller than in the case of committed outsourcing and committed profit sharing. By
using the earlier calculations according to which  L w J S     1 and   JW   w e e g' , we
can solve the first order condition (25) as follows
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W  compared with the case of committed profit
sharing. Rewriting of (26) gives the following implicit wage formation equation  (see
Appendix 5)
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                      (27)
with   
2 1 W J G X eL
wY
 
  * . If optimal flexible profit sharing is small enough, then
0 ! * , so that in this case in the presence of outsourcing the denominator in (27) is
bigger than the one in (10), so that under 0 ! *  t h e  m a r k - u p  i n  t e r m s  o f  w a g e
formation is smaller under flexible profit share.
We can summarize this as follows.
Proposition 5: In the presence of outsourcing and flexible profit
sharing the base wage formation is smaller than in the case of
committed profit sharing if optimal flexible profit sharing is small
enough.
6. Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium
Unemployment
We now move on to explore the implications of profit sharing and outsourcing on
equilibrium unemployment. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium unemployment
as a function of institutional features of labor market, defined by the benefit
replacement ratio, the structure of the compensation system, and the given
outsourcing.
The base wage formation by the monopoly labour union has the form
b A w i i                                                                      (28)20
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i A  in the
flexible case. For simplicity, we focus on the situation with identical industries in
terms of the wage mark-up, so that . A Ai    In a general equilibrium the outside option
b  will be re-interpreted to be the relevant outside option. Since we assume identical
industries with similar compensation scheme, the outside option can be specified as
   uB e g
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where u  denotes the unemployment rate in the case of committed profit sharing, B
the unemployment benefit, and w is the base wage formation and an unemployed
worker faces the probability   u  1  of being employed in another industry (for a
standard justification we refer e.g. to Nickell and Layard (1999), pp. 3048-3050 and
Layard et al. (2005), pp. 100-101).
Equation (29) captures the idea that all identical industries adopt profit
sharing, so that an unemployed worker faces the probability  u  1  of being employed
in another industry, which makes use of a similar compensation scheme. We further
restrict in these outside options to the case of a constant benefit-replacement ratio
w B q /    in the presence of unemployment, so that . 1 0   q
Combining (28) and (29) and the assumption of a constant benefit-replacement
ration, q , we can rewrite the wage equation (28) as follows
     Auqw e g
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W 1 1 . The aggregate unemployment rate in the
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1
 . In the absence of
outsourcing under the monopoly labour union’s wage formation but committed profit



























c .                               (30b)
Next, we look at the implications on equilibrium unemployment. In the
























































 	        


























                                                                                                                                  (31)
The impact of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment in this case is a priori
ambiguous for the following reasons. Higher outsourcing will lower wage elasticity of
labour demand and therefore will decrease the mark-up which will have a negative
effect on equilibrium unemployment, but higher outsourcing will also increase profit
11 Because our former assumption we can show that







































             
 	      
 	
   


























relative to wage costs so that outside option will increase and therefore will have a
positive effect on equilibrium unemployment.
In the presence of outsourcing differentiating (30a) with respect to profit
sharing gives




















































 	      

























                                                                                                                                (32a)
According to (32a), the impact of profit sharing on equilibrium unemployment in this
case is a priori ambiguous for the following reasons. Higher profit sharing will have
an ambiguous effect on the mark-up, but higher profit sharing will also increase profit
relative to wage costs, so that outside option will increase and therefore will have a
positive effect on equilibrium unemployment.
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                                                                                                                       (32b)
which is also ambiguous in terms of equilibrium unemployment.
In the case of flexible profit sharing, the base wage formation by the
monopoly labour union has the form as expressed in equation (28) in industry i,
where the mark-up is defined by    *     
 




i A , which is smaller
than in the case of committed profit sharing. It is important to emphasize that one










 (see equation (15)) and also the derivative
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  2 2 1  is a priori ambiguous.23
cannot fix the effects of outsourcing and profit sharing on the mark-up due to the new
part in the denominator of the mark-up, i.e.   *   J W 1 . The equilibrium
unemployment in the flexible case, when there is also profit sharing in the
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In the absence of outsourcing under the monopoly labour union’s wage formation we
have the following equilibrium unemployment in the presence of flexible profit
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where 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like in the case of committed profit sharing.
We can now summarize equilibrium unemployment aspects in the presence of
outsourcing and profit sharing when labour markets are imperfectly competitive as
follows.
Proposition 6: If there is profit sharing as a part of outside option in
other industries, outsourcing and profit sharing will have ambiguous
effects on equilibrium unemployment under committed profit sharing. In
the absence of outsourcing, profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect24
on equilibrium unemployment both under committed and flexible profit
sharing.
7. Optimal Strategic Outsourcing
So far we have restricted to a medium or short-run perspective where the firm has
committed to the magnitude of outsourcing activity prior to wage determination,
profit sharing, labour demand and employee effort. Now we turn to explore the initial
stage 1, where the firm commits to the outsourcing activity. It is assumed that the
l o n g - r u n  p r o d u c t i o n  m o d e  d e c i s i o n  m a y  i n t e r n a l i z e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  s h a r e  o f
outsourced production on wage formation depending on the time sequence decision of
profit sharing.
In the long-run, the firm is assumed to have rational expectations regarding
subsequent outcomes and determines the magnitude optimal committed outsourcing



















1  subject to labour
demand (5) (allowing for the envelope theorem according to 0   L S ) and effort
determination (7). Moreover, in the presence of committed profit sharing profit
maximization is also subject to wage formation (10) and profit sharing (19a)
(allowing for the envelope theorem according to 0   W S ), while in the presence of
flexible profit sharing is also subject to profit sharing (21a) (allowing for the envelope
theorem according to 0   W S ) and wage formation (27).
Allowing the envelope theorem both in terms of the optimal profit sharing
( 0   W S )  a n d  t h e  o p t i m a l  l a b o u r  d e m a n d  ( 0   L S ), we differentiate
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Differentiating (34) with respect to M  and allowing both its direct effects and the
indirect effects via the base wage and the effort determination, gives
0 ' 2
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outsourcing (see equation (35)) and the indirect marginal effects via the effect of
outsourcing on wage, i.e.   J   1 L wM .  In the presence of committed profit sharing,
outsourcing moderates base wage so that the marginal profit will increase via
  0 1 !   J L wM . But in the presence of flexible profit sharing the indirect marginal
profit   J   1 L wM  in terms of outsourcing is a priori ambiguous.
We can summarize this as follows.
Proposition 7: In terms of optimal long-run strategic outsourcing wage
moderation will have the positive indirect marginal profit in the
presence of committed profit sharing due to wage moderation, but in the
presence of flexible profit sharing this effect is a priori ambiguous.
8.      Conclusions
We have analyze the following questions associated with outsourcing and profit
sharing under imperfect labour markets by using the scenario without outsourcing:26
H o w  d o e s  s t r a t e g i c  o u t s o u r c i n g ,  w h i c h  w e  a s s u m e  t o  b e  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  e f f e c t i v e
labour, influence wage formation, profit sharing, and employee effort when firms
commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or decide profit sharing after
wage formation. We also have studied the relationship between outsourcing, profit
sharing, and equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we have characterized the long-run
perspective for the optimal production mode in terms of strategic outsourcing.
W e h av e  sh ow n  th a t i n  th e  p r e s en ce  of  ou ts ou r ci n g  th e  w a g e  el as ti ci ty  of
labour demand depends positively on the amount of outsourcing and on the wage, but
negatively on the size of profit sharing. As a result, it has been presented that in the
case of committed profit sharing strategic outsourcing has a negative effect on wage
formation. This lies in conformity with empirics and results from our assumption of
perfect substitutability between outsourcing and effective domestic labour. Under
flexible profit sharing the wage is smaller than in the case of committed profit
sharing. We also find that the profit share under commitment in the presence of
outsourcing is larger (smaller) than that associated with flexibility if the base wage
depends negatively (positively) on profit sharing.
If there is profit sharing as a part of outside option in other industries
outsourcing, profit sharing will have ambiguous effects on equilibrium
unemployment. Also in the absence of outsourcing profit sharing will have an
ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment. Finally, in terms of optimal long-run
strategic outsourcing, wage moderation will have the positive indirect marginal profit
i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c o m m i t t e d  p r o f i t  s h a r i n g  d u e  t o  w a g e  m o d e r a t i o n ,  b u t  i n  t h e
presence of flexible profit sharing this effect is a priori ambiguous.
There are several new research topics associated with these issues. We have
focused on the case where the firm decides long-term contracts that fix the amount of
outsourcing before the labour union sets the wage. Alternatively, the firm may be
flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity only after the wage
is set by the labour union. Other important issue is to study the implications of labour
t a x a t i o n  a n d  l a b o r  t a x  r e f o r m s  o n  e f f o r t ,  l a b o u r  d e m a n d ,  w a g e  f o r m a t i o n ,  p r o f i t
sharing, and equilibrium unemployment in the presence of outsourcing. Moreover,
other topics are to extend the framework to allow for heterogeneity of workers in the
domestic country in the presence of outsourcing and to allow for wage negotiations27
between labour unions and firms. Finally, it is also important to do numerical
simulations and empirical research associated with various results we have presented.
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APPENDIX 1:
The derivative of labour demand (5) with respect to the base wage is
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. Therefore, the total wage elasticity
of labour demand in terms of the base wage in the presence of outsourcing can be
expressed in (12b). QED.
APPENDIX 2:
Differentiating the implicit wage formation (10) with respect to the base wage and
outsourcing gives
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which can be expressed as
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Using equation (10), i.e.     > @
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1 1 w
b , the relationship between the wage
formation and outsourcing can be written as  equation (14).
Differentiating the equation (10) with the base wage and profit sharing gives
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which can be expressed as
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b ,  the relationship
between wage formation and outsourcing can be written as equation (15). QED.
APPENDIX 3:
Using the first-order condition for profit share commitment given outsourcing, i.e.
  0 1      W S W S , so that 0 ! W S  a n d  w e  c a n  r e w r i t e  i t  a s  f o l l o w s
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This can be expressed as         1
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given outsourcing M  the optimal committed profit sharing can be presented as
 






































c .                                                 (A7)
QED.31
APPENDIX 4:
By differentiating the implicit profit share function (21a) with respect to the profit
sharing and the outsourcing gives the following total differential
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By using e e
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which gives
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, we can re-express (A10) as (22).
By differentiating the implicit profit share function (21a) with respect to the profit
sharing and the base wage gives the following total differential
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By using e e
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which gives33
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In (A13) 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APPENDIX 5:
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In the presence of outsourcing differentiating (31a) with respect to M  gives   -34
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